mirror of
https://github.com/ItsDrike/dotfiles.git
synced 2024-12-27 21:54:34 +00:00
187 lines
6.8 KiB
Markdown
187 lines
6.8 KiB
Markdown
# Secure Boot
|
|
|
|
This guide will show you how to set up UEFI Secure Boot with Arch Linux. Once
|
|
finished, you will be left with a system that doesn't allow booting any
|
|
untrusted EFI images (other operating systems, fraudulently modified kernels,
|
|
...) on your machine.
|
|
|
|
This guide assumes you're following from the
|
|
[INSTALLATION](./01_INSTALLATION.md) guide and that you're using [UNIFIED KERNEL
|
|
IMAGES](./03_UNIFIED_KERNEL_IMAGES.md) (UKIs) for booting.
|
|
|
|
## Security requirements
|
|
|
|
Meeting these requirements is optional, as it is possible to set up secure boot
|
|
without them. That said, if you don't meet these, setting up secure boot will
|
|
not be a very effective security measure and it might be more of a time waste
|
|
than a helpful means of enhancing your security.
|
|
|
|
First requirement is to set up a **BIOS Password**. This is a password that you
|
|
will be asked for every time you wish to enter the BIOS (UEFI). This is
|
|
necessary, as without it, an attacker could very easily just go to the BIOS and
|
|
disable Secure Boot.
|
|
|
|
The second requirement is having **disk encryption**, at least for the root
|
|
partition. This is important, because the UEFI signing keys will be stored here,
|
|
and you don't want someone to potentially be able to get access to them, as it
|
|
would allow them to sign any malicious images, making them pass secure boot.
|
|
|
|
> [!WARNING]
|
|
> Even after following all of these, you should be aware that Secure Boot isn't
|
|
> an unbreakable solution. In fact, if someone is able to get a hold of your
|
|
> machine, they can simply pull out the CMOS battery, which usually resets the
|
|
> UEFI. That means turning off Secure Boot, and getting rid of the BIOS
|
|
> password.
|
|
>
|
|
> While Secure Boot is generally a good extra measure to have, it is by no means
|
|
> a reliable way to completely prevent others from ever being able to boot
|
|
> untrusted systems, unless you use a specialized motherboard, which persists
|
|
> the UEFI state.
|
|
|
|
## Enter Setup mode
|
|
|
|
To allow us to upload new signing keys into secure boot, we will need to enter
|
|
"setup mode". This should be possible by going to the Secure Boot category in
|
|
your UEFI settings, and clicking on Delete/Clear certificates, or there could
|
|
even just be a "Setup Mode" option directly.
|
|
|
|
Once enabled, save the changes and boot back into Arch linux.
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
pacman -S sbctl
|
|
sbctl status
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Make sure that `sbctl` reports that Setup Mode is Enabled.
|
|
|
|
## Create Secure Boot keys
|
|
|
|
We can now create our new signing keys for secure boot. These keys will be
|
|
stored in `/usr/share/secureboot` (so in our encrypted root partition). Once
|
|
created, we will add (enroll) these keys into the UEFI firmware (only possible
|
|
when in setup mode)
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
sbctl create-keys
|
|
sbctl enroll-keys -m
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
<!-- markdownlint-disable MD028 -->
|
|
|
|
> [!WARNING]
|
|
> The `-m` option (also known as `--microsoft`) will make sure to also include
|
|
> the Microsoft signing keys. This is required by most motherboards, not using
|
|
> it could brick your device.
|
|
|
|
> [!NOTE]
|
|
> If you encounter "File is immutable" warnings after running sbctl, it should
|
|
> be safe to simply add the `-i` (or `--ignore-immutable`) flag, which will run
|
|
> `chattr` and remove the immutable flags from these files for you.
|
|
>
|
|
> You can also do so manually with `chattr -i [file]` for all the listed
|
|
> immutable files and then re-run the enroll-keys command.
|
|
>
|
|
> This happens because the Linux kernel will sometimes mark the runtime EFI
|
|
> files as immutable for security - to prevent bricking the device with just `rm
|
|
-rf /*`, or similar stupid commands, however since we trust that `sbctl` will
|
|
> work and won't do anything malicious, we can just remove the immutable flag,
|
|
> and re-running will now work).
|
|
>
|
|
> If you still encounter errors even with this flag, it means you have probably
|
|
> done something wrong when entering the setup mode. Try looking for a option
|
|
> like "Reset keys" in your UEFI, then try this again.
|
|
|
|
<!-- markdownlint-enable MD028 -->
|
|
|
|
## Sign the bootloader and Unified Kernel Images
|
|
|
|
Finally then, we can sign the `.efi` executables that we'd like to use:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
sbctl sign -s -o /usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/systemd-bootx64.efi.signed /usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/systemd-bootx64.efi
|
|
sbctl sign -s /efi/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI
|
|
sbctl sign -s /efi/EFI/systemd/systemd-bootx64.efi
|
|
sbctl sign -s /efi/EFI/Linux/arch-linux.efi
|
|
sbctl sign -s /efi/EFI/Linux/arch-linux-fallback.efi
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
(If you're booting directly from UKI images, only sign those - in `/efi/EFI/Linux`)
|
|
|
|
The `-s` flag means save: The files will be automatically re-signed when we
|
|
update the kernel (via a sbctl pacman hook).
|
|
|
|
> [!TIP]
|
|
> To make sure that this is the case, we can run `pacman -S linux` and check
|
|
> that messages about image signing appear.
|
|
>
|
|
> They should look something like this:
|
|
>
|
|
> ```text
|
|
> Signing /efi/EFI/Linux/arch-linux.efi
|
|
> ✓ Signed /efi/EFI/Linux/arch-linux.efi
|
|
> ...
|
|
> Signing /efi/EFI/Linux/arch-linux-fallback.efi
|
|
> ✓ Signed /efi/EFI/Linux/arch-linux-fallback.efi
|
|
> ...
|
|
> File has already been signed /efi/EFI/Linux/arch-linux-fallback.efi
|
|
> File has already been signed /efi/EFI/Linux/arch-linux.efi
|
|
> File has already been signed /efi/EFI/systemd/systemd-bootx64.efi
|
|
> File has already been signed /usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/systemd-bootx64.efi.signed
|
|
> File has already been signed /efi/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI
|
|
> ```
|
|
|
|
When done, we can make sure that everything that needed to be signed really was
|
|
signed with:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
sbctl verify
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
You can also check that setup mode got disabled after enrolling the keys:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
sbctl status
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Setup mode status should now report as `Disabled`. (Secure boot will still not
|
|
appear as enabled though.)
|
|
|
|
## Reboot with secure boot
|
|
|
|
We should now be ready to enable secure boot, as our `.efi` images were signed,
|
|
and the signing key was enrolled to UEFI firmware. So, all that remains is:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
reboot
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Boot into UEFI, go to the Secure Boot settings and enable it. (It might get
|
|
enabled automatically on some UEFI firmware after setup mode, but it's not
|
|
always the case.)
|
|
|
|
### Verify it worked
|
|
|
|
To make sure that it worked as expected, and you're booted with secure-boot
|
|
enabled, you can now run:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
sbctl status
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
It should report `Secure Boot: enabled` or `Secure Boot: enabled (user)`.
|
|
|
|
## Why bother?
|
|
|
|
As I mentioned, secure boot can be bypassed if someone tries hard enough
|
|
(pulling the CMOS battery). That then brings to question whether it's even worth
|
|
it to set it up, when it doesn't really give you that much.
|
|
|
|
On its own, I probably wouldn't bother with setting up secure-boot, however
|
|
secure boot allows me to set up TPM (Trusted Platform Module) to automatically
|
|
release the decryption keys for my LUKS encrypted root partition, in a secure
|
|
way. This means I won't have to type my disk password every time I boot which is
|
|
actually the primary reason why I like having secure-boot enabled.
|
|
|
|
For more information on this, check out the follow-up guide:
|
|
[TPM_UNLOCKING](./06_TPM_UNLOCKING.md).
|